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NOTES
THE, LAw ScnooL-Enrollment for the year 1930-1931 is 493,
just a few less than last year when the total reached 515, the largest
in the history of the school.1
The present enrollment is entirely satisfactory. All members of
each class now in the school have not only met the requirement of a
college degree, but have, through interviews with the Admissions
Committee, given evidence of their fitness for the study and practice
of law. The scheme of selective admissions, while a considerable
burden to operate, gives continued evidence of its value with each
year of its application.
The school is continuing to attract a larger proportion of graduates from other institutions. The 'University of Pennsylvania still
continues to furnish the largest proportion of the entering class and
should normally continue to do so. But the percentage of entering
students from other colleges has risen in four years from 43 per cent.
University of Pennsylvania:
College
Wharton School
Miscellaneous
Other Institutions:
I
Albright
x
Allegheny
I
Antioch
I
Brown
6
Bucknell
2
Colgate
6
Cornell
I
DePauw
6
Dickinson
I
Duquesne
I
Fordham
a
Franklin and Marshall
I
Geneva
I
Georgetown
x
Gettysburg
I
Grove City
5
Harvard
4
Haverford
3
Holy Cross
9
Lafayette
3
Lehigh
I
Mt. Holyoke
2
Muhlenberg
New Jersey College for Women I
2
Pa. Military College
6
Pennsylvania State
36% + from University of Pennsylvania.
63%. + from other colleges.
21 new colleges represented.
1

Princeton
Radcliffe
St. Bonaventure
St. John's
St. Joseph's
St. Thomas
St Vincent
Susquehanna
Swarthmore
Syracuse
Temple
University of Delaware
University of Georgia
University of Michigan
University of Pittsburgh
University of Southern California
Ursinus
Villanova
Virginia Military
Washington
West Virginia University
Williams
Yale
Total

39
36
0

9
r
2
2

7
I
I
I

I
Io

5
I
I
I
I

4
5
2

I
I
I
2

206

The division by classes is: First Year 206; Second Year 142; Third Year

139; Unclassified 3; Graduates 4.

NOTES
to 64 per cent.2 During the same period, the proportion of students

coming from outside the State of Pennsylvania increased 7 per cent.
Professor Austin T. Wright is on leave of absence for the
current year. In his absence his courses in Corporations and Partnership are being given by Alexander Hamilton Frey, M. A., LL. B.,
J. S. D., who comes as Visiting Professor. Mr. Frey, after a time
in practice with Simpson, Thacher and Bartlett in New York, has
been a member of the faculty at the Yale Law School. He is special
adviser on the Restatement of the Law of Business Associations for
the American Law Institute, assisting Dr. William Draper Lewis
who is in charge of the work in this subject in addition to his duties
as Director.
Mr. William E. Mikell, Jr., Assistant Professor of Law, has
resigned to resume practice with Saul, Ewing, Remick & Saul, of
Philadelphia, with whom he was associated before becoming a member of the faculty. The course in Sales, formerly taught by Mr.
Mikell is being given by Mr. Carroll Wetzel, LL. B., 1930, of Trenton, New Jersey, who is one of the Gowen Fellows for the current
year.
Mr. W. James Macintosh who taught the course in Pennsylvania Practice last year has resigned. The course in Practice and
the work in Practice Court are being given by Mr. Philip Amram
of the firm of Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen.
During the past year the rules regarding requirements for graduation have received a great deal of attention from the faculty. A
revision was adopted, designed to require a somewhat higher standard of performance. The rules will continue to receive attention this
year. There is no desire to set a mark for scholastic achievement
that cannot be reached by the student. But there is a strong desire,
in which all interested in the school will share, to make graduation
from the school signify a high standard of accomplishment.
Herbert F. Goodrich.
COMPULSORY MOTOR ACCIDENT INSURANCE EXCLUSIVELY
WITH THE STATE-In current years the states have sought to en-

gage in fields of competitive business and the problem has arisen
whether or not the state's embarking upon these enterprises is consistent with its constitutional limitations. But a question far more
important was recently presented in Massachusetts; to determine the
extent to which a state may, in protecting the welfare of its citizens,
invade the realm of private business which it is empowered to regulate.' The court was requested to render an opinion upon the validThe institutions represented are as follows:
".

..

a state may rightfully prescribe uniform regulations necessary for

public safety and order in respect to the operation upon its highways of all
motor vehicles." 2 CooLEy, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (8th ed. 1927) 1284.
"The power of a State to regulate the use of motor vehicles on the highways has
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ity of a proposed act of legislature establishing a "State Motor Vehicle Insurance Fund," 2 providing for compulsory motor accident insurance,3 and requiring contributions to a state-managed fund as a
prerequisite to the registration of motor vehicles within its jurisdiction. The fund was to be administered by commissioners, appointed
by the governor, for the purpose of providing compensation for those
injured or killed on the highway. The specific inquiry was whether
the state could constitutionally perform acts which in effect would
prohibit insurance companies from continuing their widespread activities in respect to personal injuries in motor accidents. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts decided, in Opinion Of The
Justices,4 that the bill would create a substantial monopoly in a field
of competitive enterprise, and, not being a justifiable exercise of the
police power, was invalid. This opinion is of outstanding importance
in that it represents the first denial of the right of a state to undertake
the practice of insurance to the virtual exclusion of existing private
companies; because it is the first judicial opinion upon a proposed enactment that is representative of bills pending in other legislatures;
and because it is indicative of a growing tendency among the various
states to depart from a civil form of government to one more socialistic.
The first notable instance in which a state sought to create a.
monopoly in a private employment was the Slaughter House Cases,'
decided in 1872, where the State of Louisiana, by legislative enactment, created a corporation to conduct the slaughtering business
within certain limits and restrained all other persons from continuing
similar occupations within that area. The statute was declared to be
constitutional in that it forbade none from pursuing the vocation of
butcher, or from performing his own slaughtering, but required as a
been recently considered by this court and broadly sustained," Mr. Justice
To the
Brandeis in Kane v. N. J., 242 U. S. 16o, 167, 37 Sup. Ct. 30, 31 (916).
same effect Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 61o, 35 Sup. Ct 140 (1914);
Pawloski v. Hess, 25o Mass. 22, 144 N. E. 760 (1924). The business of insurance is affected with a public interest, and it is a fundamental principal that such
enterprises may be regulated by statute, German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233
U. S. 389, 34 Sup. Ct. 612 (1913).
'Initiative Petition of Frank A. Goodwin and others for the establishment
of a State Motor Vehicle Insurance Fund to provide compensation for injuries
and deaths due to motor vehicle accidents, House No. 202. "No motor vehicle
or trailer except . . . shall be registered . . . unless the application therefor is accompanied by a contribution to the fund as required . . . and the
payment of said contribution shall constitute an acceptance of the provisions of
law relative to the fund."
' In connection with this case it was not necessary to consider the constitutionality of the compulsory feature of the plan as the Act of April 29,
1925, MAss. CuM. STAT. (x927)-"An act requiring owners of certain motor
vehicles and trailers to furnish security for their civil liability on account of personal injuries caused by their motor vehicles and trailers" was upheld in a
declaratory judgment in Opinion of theJustices, 251 Mass. 569, I47 N. E. 681

(1925).

171 N. E. 294 (Mass. i93o).

1i6 Wall. 36 (1872) ; four members of the court dissented.
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police measure, that it be done at prescribed places. Twenty years
later the State of South Carolina prohibited the manufacture or sale
of liquors except by the state. The act was held to be invalid 6 because traffic in intoxicating liquors was neither unlawful nor malum
in se, and since there was no necessity for the act, it violated constitutional guaranties. The same court reached an opposite conclusion
when the identical problem was presented a year later, in deciding
that the act was a proper exercise of the police power; in that there
was no inherent right to deal in liquor, since traffic in intoxicants is
7
attended with danger to the general welfare of the community. Then
commercial
in
to
engage
states
the
by
of
attempts
followed a series
enterprises, which were, for the most part, held to interfere with the
rights of the citizens and were declared invalid, 8 save only those enacted as police or emergency measures. °
In more recent years, the decided trend of authority manifests
a complete reversal of attitude and courts have permitted, in the main,
state participation in private enterprises."0 Since the pertinent provisions of the Constitution have remained unaltered, this change can
be attributed only to a modification of judicial sentiment, reflecting
an agitation for socialistic measures at the expense of civil form of
government. Considering this change of attitude, the proposed Massachusetts law is neither startling nor revolutionary, but is merely a
further advance in the states' endeavor to undertake private business,
and follows in natural sequence after the compulsory workmen's com'McCullough v. Brown, 41 S. C. 220, ig S. E. 458 (1893) ; one dissent
' State v. Aiken, 42 S. C. 222, 18 S. E. 69o (1894). But note the following
excerpt from Mr. Justice Gary's opinion at 247: "As we have said, if the act
is not a police measure, it is unconstitutional." Mr. Chief Justice McIver dis-

sented; it is interesting to note that since the decision in McCullough v. Brown,
supra note 6, the court had undergone a change in personnel.
'Parkersburg v. Brown, io6 U. S. 487, 1 Sup. Ct. 442 (1882) (to loan
money); Dodge v. Mission Township, IO7 Fed. 827 (C. C. A. 8th Dist igoi)
(sugar factories); Keen v. Mayor and Council of Waycross, 1O Ga. 588, 29
S. E. 42 (1897) (plumbing business) ; Lowell v. City of Boston, III Mass. 454
(1873) (loans to land-owners) ; Opinion of the Justices, 155 Mass. 598, 30 N. E.
1142 (1892) (wood and coal) ; Opinion of the Justices, 182 Mass. 6o5, 66 N. E.
(wood and coal) ; Rippe v. Becker, 56 Minn. 100, 57 N. W. 331 (1894)
25 (903)
(grain elevator) ; New York Sanitary Utilization Co. v. Department of Public
Health of New York, 32 Misc. (N. Y.) 577, 67 N. Y. Suppl. 324 (I9OO) (garbage business).
IState v. Weinrich, 54 Mont. 390, 170 Pac. 942 (9,8) (borrow for crop
failure) ; State v. Nelson County, i N. D. 88, 45 N. W. 33 (189o) (purchase
seed for needy farmers).
" Jones v. City of Portland, 245 U. S. 217, 38 Sup. Ct 112 (1917) (coal and
wood); Holton v. City of Camilla, 134 Ga. 56o, 68 S. E. 472 (191o) (ice business) ; Union Ice & Coal Co. v. Town of Rushton, 135 La. 898, 66 So. 262
(1914) (ice business); Green v. Frazier, 44 N. D. 395, 176 N. W. ii (192o)
(banking, farm products, etc.) ; Minot School District v. Olseness, 53 N. D. 683,
208 N. W. 968 (1926) (state fire and tornado insurance) ; Laughlin v. Portland,
iii Me. 486, 90 Atl. 318 (914) (coal and wood) ; State v. Stewart, 58 Mont. i,
i9o Pac. 129 (192o) (grain elevator).
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pensation funds. This type of insurance fund is but one of ten varieties " established by the various states and dates back to 1829,
though of relatively slight importance until the twentieth century.
State funds are either optional or compulsory: "compulsory" if the
individual must resort to the state alone as insurer; "optional" if private undertakings are not prohibited and the individual is permitted
to choose between the state and a private company as insurer, or to
deposit security in lieu thereof."2 When the fund is of the latter
type, the sole inquiry is whether the state is privileged to enter that
business and no question of any violation of the rights of individuals
is presented. A serious constitutional problem is raised, however,
when a state, as in the principal case, seeks to establish a monopoly
in a field of lawful enterprise wherein private companies have been

competing.
Resort to the court's opinion discloses that by reason of a statute,"2 there is existing a large business of insuring motor-owners

against civil liability for personal injuries, conducted by private companies. And since "the right to conduct a lawful business is a property right, protected by the common law and guaranteed by the organic law of the state," 14 it is apparent that the bill would deprive
the insurance companies of their property without due process of
law," ' unless it may be authorized under the police power. The bill
In addition to the workmen's compensation funds, there are teacher's pension funds, state employees' pension funds, hail insurance funds, bank guaranty
funds, public deposits guaranty funds, public property insurance funds, life insurance funds, Torrens title insurance funds, and public official bonding funds;
McCAHAN, STATE INSURANCE (1929). The writer has been able to find but one
case testing the constitutionality of any of the nine funds mentioned above,
namely Noble Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 31 Sup. Ct. 186 (igii) upholding

a public deposits guaranty fund.
18 N. Y. ANN. CONS. LAWS (2d ed. 19,7) 93o7; New York Central Railroad v. White, 243 U. S. i88, 37 Sup. Ct. 247 (1916), Mr. Justice Pitney at 2o9:
"This being so, it is obvious that this case presents no question as to whether the
State might, consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment, compel employers to
effect insurance according to either of the plans mentioned in the first or second
clauses. There is no such compulsion, since self-insurance under the third clause
presumably is open to all employers on reasonable terms that is within the power
of the State to impose. Regarded as optional agreements, for acceptance or
rejection by employers unwilling to comply with that clause, the plans of insurance are unexceptionable from the constitutional standpoint"
Supranote 3.
"Godin . Niebuhr, 236 Mass. 350, 351, 128 N. E. 4o6, 4o7 (92o) ; State v.
5,5. 51 N. W. 858, 865 (i8gz). "An established business is in
Scougal, 3 S.
essential respects like a right of property. The experience gained in pursuing it,
the connections formed through it, the confidence of patrons and clients, are
valuable and profitable assets, which the law, under the name of good will, recognizes as a species of property, and as, to a certain extent, transferable."
FREUND, POLICE POWER (1904) 543.
' In the case of corporations, such legislation would virtually take away or

alter the charter, depending on its powers, and the further constitutional objection of impairment of the obligation of contracts would be incurred, under the
decision in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat: 518 (i8i).

NOTES

can be supported if its raison d'&tre is similar to that underlying the
compulsory workmen's compensation, which has been adjudged as
constitutional.' 6 In the case upholding the Washington act,'7 it appears that it was declared constitutional as a police measure, viz., "To
support the State of Washington in concluding that the matter of
compensation for accidental injuries .

.

. employed in hazardous

occupations is of sufficient public moment to justify making the entire matter of compensation a public concern, to be administered
through state agencies." "I Accordingly if the proposed legislation
is to be upheld, it must come within the category of reasonable regulation.' 9 In support thereof it must be admitted that motor traffic
is a constant source of danger to the welfare of the state and, if unregulated, the financial irresponsibility of motor owners would be
harmful to the well-being of the public. In addition, any possible
fraudulent practices by the insurance companies, such as inequitable
settlements, would deprive those injured of the benefit of those measures. Some authority might be obtained from Mr. Justice Holmes'
argument:
"There is nothing I deprecate more than the use of the
Fourteenth Amendment beyond the absolute compulsion of its
words to prevent the making of social experiments that an important part of the community desires, in its insulated chambers
afforded by the several states . ..

20

And finally it may be urged that the power to compel the individual
to purchase insurance 21 might be said to include the right to dictate
from whom that insurance must be taken.
The writer feels that these arguments are untenable. The proposition that the right to compel the purchase of insurance includes
the power to dictate from whom it must be obtained regards only the
relationship between the state and the motor-owner, and entirely overlooks the interests of a third party, the insurance company, whose
fundamental rights are the sole controversy under the bill in question.
"Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219, 37 Sup. Ct. 26o
(I916).
273 WASH. CoMP. STAT. (Remington, 1922) 7673.
It provides that the
remedy afforded by the state system shall be exclusive of all other remedies or
proceedings. Accordingly, this statute is the nearest approach to the one under
discussion.
'Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, supra note 16, at 239, 37 Sup. Ct.
at 265.
A
The police power of the state extends only to such measures as are reasonable, and the general rule is that all such measures must be reasonable under
all circumstances, State v. Phelps, i44 Wis. I, 128 N. W. lo4r (igio); Ex parte
Quarg, 149 Cal. 79,84 Pac. 766 (906).
'Dissenting opinion in Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312A 42 Sup. Ct 124
(1921).

' Supra note 3.
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In respect to Mr. justice Holmes' doctrine, it is submitted that his policy appears to have found little support elsewhere, and further, that
the instant case could be included in the actual wording of the Constitution and thus within the exception set forth in his argument. The
fact that people may, in spite of statutory regulation of insurance
companies, be subjected to unethical practices, is not a reason for
state usurpation under the guise of the police power. Every business
offers some opportunities for censurable dealings, but it cannot be
seriously contended that the state governments should take over all
enterprises and occupations ; 22 these undesirable usages could be reduced to a minimum through the control of a commission.
The real reason for the failure of the bill is this: that though
the legislature may very properly regulate the subject, it has exceeded
the measures to which it may justifiably resort. The police power of
a state to regulate a business does not include the power to engage in
carrying it on, 2, and the power to regulate does not include the power
to confiscate.24 Hence, if the legislature can achieve the same result
by setting a maximum rate for private insurance companies, and
maintaining in general, a supervisory control over the service, the
state would not be justified in destroying an established business.
Only as a last resort to protect the public, should the legislature remedy an undesirable situation by prohibiting, in effect, the continuance
of a lawful calling; 25 anything short of this extreme necessity would
be subversive of established rules of policy, contrary to the spirit of
freedom of enterprise, and destructive of vested interests in private

property.
M. C. S.

'Adams v. Tanner, 244 U. S. 590, 37 Sup. Ct. 662 (1917). Mr. Justice
Reynolds, at 594: "Because abuses may, and probably do, grow up in connection
with this business, is adequate reason for hedging it about with proper regulations. But this is not enough to justify the destruction of one's right to follow
a distinctly useful calling in an upright way. Certainly there is no profession,
probably no business, which does not offer peculiar opportunities for reprehensible practises; and as to every one of them, some can be found quite ready
earnestly to maintain that its suppression would be in the public interest. Skillfully directed agitation might also bring about apparent condemnation of any
one of them by the public. Happily for all, the fundamental guaranties of the
Constitution cannot be freely submerged if and whenever some ostensible justification is advanced and the police power invoked."
Rippe V.Becker, supra note 8, at 112 57 N. W. at 333.
'Adams v. Tanner, supra note 22.
'Booth v. Illinois, 184 U. S. 425, 22 Sup. Ct. 42! (igoI), Mr. Justice
Harlan: "If, looking at all the circumstances that attend, or which may ordinarily attend, the pursuit of a particular calling, the State thinks that certain
admitted evils cannot be successfully reached unless that calling can be actually
prohibited, the courts cannot interfere, unless looking through mere forms and
at the substance of the matter, they can say that the statute enacted . . . is
a dear, unmistakable infringement of rights secured by the fundamental law."
(Italics the writer's.)

NOTES
RIGHT OF TRUSTEES TO RETAIN UNAPPROVED SECURITIES HELD
BY THE CREATOR OF THE TRusT-The majority of states have, by

constitutional provisions, statutes, rules of court, or otherwise, established definite classes of securities in which a trustee may legally invest the trust estate.' A trustee who, in good faith, makes a proper
trust investment is, in all jurisdictions, relieved from liability for loss.
Frequently, however, the estate which reaches the trustee consists, in
whole or in part, of securities which are not legal investments for
trust funds. In this situation, the question arises whether the trustee
is required to reinvest the estate, or whether he may retain the existing securities without being subject to surcharge in case of loss.
While the decisions in this country are not uniform, the weight
of authority seems to be that in the absence of statute or a contrary
provision in the instrument creating the trust, the right of a trustee
to retain investments made by the creator of the trust is no greater
than his right to make the investment originally.2 In Ashurst v. Potter,3 Gummere, Master, states:

"Retaining improper investments was, in effect, making
them; retention in such cases is a positive act; and the fact that
the testator had considered these stocks good investments, and
had invested in them, cannot excuse them (the trustees) for
investing in them."
The fact that the trustee, in retaining unapproved securities, has used
the prudence and business foresight of a careful man does not, under
the rule here expressed, protect him in any way. 4 His duty with regard to the trust estate is to exercise discretion only in those matters
which a trustee is allowed by law to do.'
In some states considerable latitude was at one time given to
trustees in disposing of non-legal investments made by the creator
of the trust. As late at I85O both New York 6 and Pennsylvania '

' See MCKINNEY, TRUST INVESTMENTS (2d ed. 1927) for statutes regulating
the investment of trust funds in the various states.
'Ashurst v. Potter, 29 N. J. Eq. 625 (1878); Ward v. Kitchen, 3o N. J.
Eq. 31 (1878) ; Re Keane, 95 Misc. 25, 16o N. Y. Supp. 2oo (i916); Re Leitchs
Will, 185 Wis. 257, 2oi N. W. 284 (1924) (an action to interpret the will of the
testator).

In no jurisdiction may a trustee continue a speculative account begun by the
creator of the trust: Re Hirsch's Estate, ioi N. Y. Supp. 893 (i9o6), aff'd, i88
N. Y. 584, 8I N. E. 1165 (i9o7) ; cf. Mathews v. Sheehan, 76 Conn. 654, 57 Atl.
694 (i9o4).
' Supra note

2, at 632.
'Wotton v. DeReau, 167 N. Y. 629, 6o N. E. 1123 (IgoI).
The trustee should dispose of non-legal investments within a reasonable
time: Babbitt v. Fidelity Trust Co., 72 N. J. Eq. 745, 66 At. io76 (19O7). As
to what constitutes a reasonable time see: Re Keane, supra note 2; Matter of

Weston, 91 N. Y. 502 (1883).

The same rule doubtless applies to investments which, though legal when
made, are subsequently declared illegal.
'Jones v. Jones, 5o Hun 603, 2 N. Y. Supp. 844 (i888).
Coggin's Appeal, 124 Pa. 10, 3 Walk. 426 (i88o).
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held that a trustee was not liable for a loss occasioned through a failure to dispose of such. investments, provided that the retention constituted an honest exercise of judgment based on actual consideration
of existing conditions. 8 The courts acted, with some justification,
upon the theory that the existence of such investments in the estate
committed to the trustee was equivalent to a direct authorization to
retain them if the trustee should see fit. It is unnecessary to discuss
this rule at length. It has been repudiated in New York today ;9 and
in Pennsylvania it has been so modified that only extraordinary conditions will justify the trustee in retaining unapproved investments. 10
Although, as it has been shown, the trustee should, in general,
dispose of non-legal securities held by the creator of the trust, his
duty to do so may be modified by the terms of the instrument creating the trust. If the trustee is directed to retain the securities committed to him, whether they be legal investments or not, he cannot
be held liable for loss resulting from his failure to dispose of them; I,
in fact, he may not sell them except by authority of the court. Frequently, however, the trustee is merely authorized, in general terms,
to deal with the investment of the trust estate as he may, in his discretion, see fit. Here, unless the terms of the trust instrument are
most explicit, the tendency of the courts is to compel the sale of the
non-legal securities and the reinvestment of the fund in securities
which are approved by law. 2

In Babbitt v. Fidelity Trust Co.,' 3

Garrison, V. C., expresses the rule as follows:
"Differently stated, I think that this clause confides the
property to the trustee to be dealt with as its judgment deems
advisable, subject to those rules which govern trustees; that its
discretion, in other words, was not to do unauthorized things,
but to exercise its judgment concerning what authorized things
it would do."
"Taylor's Estate, 277 Pa. 518, 121 Ati. 3io, 37 A. L. R. 553 (1923).

lRe Douglas, 6o App. Div. 64, 69 N. Y. Supp. 687 (i9Ol) ; -ReKeane, mtpra
note 2.

It will be observed, however, that in many recent New York decisions the
wording of the trust instrument has been liberally construed to allow-the continuance of non-legal investments: infra note 14.
10Brown's Estate, 287 Pa. 499, 135 Atl. 112 (1926). Apparently, the trustee, to be relieved from liability, must show that there was no market for the
securities retained, or that their market price was obviously below their true
value.
See also
orthrup v. Browne, 2o4 Fed. 224, i2 C. C. A. 496 (913).
cases cited infra note I5.
'Tuttle v. Gilmore, 36 N. J. Eq. 617 (1883) ; cf. Trust Co. v. Trust Co.,
25o Ill. 86, 95 N. E. 59 (i91i).
"Supra note 5, at 758, 66 Atl. at io8i. The trust agreement authorizes the
trustee: "to hold and possess or dispose of and convey the same, by proper instruments of conveyance, as in its judgment may be deemed advisable, and to
collect the principal of securities and reinvest the same from time to time." Cf.
Brown v. Brown, infra note 22.

NOTES

In New York alone the rule is less strict, the tendency of the courts
being to construe the wording of the instrument creating the trust
so as to permit, when reasonable, the continuance of investments made
by the creator of the trust. 4
A somewhat different situation arises when a trust is created in
specific securities. It is obvious that the trustee may not disregard
the directions of the creator of the trust without being subject to
surcharge for resulting loss. It follows that be may not dispose of
specific investments which have been placed in trust, whether they
are of a class recognized by law as being proper for the investment
of trust funds, or not.15
Although, in general, a trustee should not retain unapproved investments received from the creator of the trust, he may, nevertheless, be relieved from liability by the consent or acquiescence of the
cestui que trust to that course of action. Such consent may be either
express or implied; or the beneficiary may be estopped to deny the

Necessarily the
authority of the trustee to retain the investment.'
cestui que trust must be of full legal capacity if his consent to the
retention of the non-legal investment is to relieve the trustee in case
of loss.' 7
In several states, the problem under discussion has been dealt
with specifically by the legislature. A statute in Illinois 1s permits a
trustee to retain non-legal securities received by him from the creator
4
Re Wolf, i Connoly 102, 2 N. Y. Supp. 494 (1888) ; Bartol's Estate, 182
Pa. 407, 38 At. 527 (1897) ; Dunklee v. Butler, 30 Misc. 58, 62 N. Y. Supp. 921
(1899). But the court has power to review the use of the trustee's discretion:
Re Keane, isupra note 2.
Where the trust instrument authorizes or directs the sale of the existing
investments, it is the duty of the trustee to reinvest the estate in legal securities:
Clark v. Beers, 61 Conn. 87, 23 Ati. 717 (1891) (a suit by a trustee for the
construction of the testator's will). Note that unless prohibited from selling
non-legal securities, the trustee is at liberty to do so and to reinvest the money
in approved investments: Guaranty Trust Co. v. U. S. Steel Corp., 107 Misc.
720, 176 N. Y. Supp. 402 (i918).
'5Murray v. Feinour, 2 Md. Ch. 418 (1851) ; Ward v. Kitchen, supra note
2; Golder v. Littlejohn, 30 Wis. 344 (x872) ; see Penn v. Fogler, 182 Ill. 76, 55

N. E.

192

(1899).

The court, however, has power to authorize a sale if it sees fit: Murray v.
Feinour, stpra; Richardson v. Knight, 69 Me. 285 (1879).
The principles set forth in this note apply equally to investments received
from a predecessor in trust: Missionary Society v. Coming, 164 Mich. 395, 129
N. W. 686 (1911); Villard v. Villard, 319 N. Y. 482, 114 N. E. 789 (igqs).
Contra: Jack's Appeal, 94 Pa. 367 (i88o) ; Fahnestock's Appeal, 1o4 Pa. 46
(1883) (both decided at a time when Pennsylvania allowed the continuance of
non-legal investments).
"Pope v. Farnsworth, 146 Mass. 339, 16 N. E. 262 (1888); Matter of
Douglas, 6o N. Y. App. Div. 64, 69 N. Y. Supp. 687 (igoi) ; Matter of Hall,
164 N. Y. 196 (igoo).
I Murray v. Feinour, supi-cz note 1S. And he must be fully apprised of the
effect of his legal rights: Adair v. Brimmer, 74 N. Y. 539 (1878).
1Ii.. RFv. STAT. (Cahill, 1925), c. 3, § 144; Merchants' Loan Co. v. Northern Trust Co., suspra note 12.

8o

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

of the trust. Connecticut,'9 likewise, permits the retention of unapproved securities, by the trustee, "unless otherwise directed by the
court of probate or by the instrument creating the trust." ." A similar statute is in force in New Jersey.2 1 It applies, however, only to
2 2
It makes, in
trusts created by will, and not to trusts inter vivos.
addition, a requirement not found in the two statutes just cited,
23
namely, that of "reasonable discretion" on the part of the trustee.
The problem presented in this note is one of public policy. On
the one hand, it is desirable to throw complete protection around trust
estates by regulating the class of securities in which a trustee may
invest. On the other hand, it is obvious today that many so-called
non-legal investments are equal in safety to those approved by law
for the investment of trust funds. It is submitted that the solution
of the problem rests in the adoption of statutes similar to those existing in Illinois, Connecticut and New Jersey. At the present time, it
would seem that unless a trustee acts under the direction of the creator of the trust, the cestui que trust, or the court, he should, for his
own safety, dispose of non-legal investments which are present in the
estate, and reinvest the fund only in those securities which are approved by law for the investment of trust estates.
N. M. E., Jr.

THE RIGHT OF A MINOR CHILD TO MAINTAIN AN ACTION IN

TORT AGAINST HIS PARENT-Although the right of a minor child to
maintain contract actions' and actions concerning real property2
against his parent was settled early in our law, no cases testing the
existence of a right in a child to recover in a tort action arose until
the nineteenth century. 3 No English court has yet been called upon
to decide the question. In America, there are but thirteen cases deal'CoX-..
GEN. STAT. (1918), §49o4.
Beardsley v. Bridgport Asylum, 76 Conn. 56o, 57 AUt. I65 (1904) (an
action to construe the will of the testator) ; see State v. Washburn, 67 Conn.
187, 34 Atl. 1034 (1896) ; Curtis v. Osborn, 79 Conn. 555 (1907).
"N. J. CoMP. STAT. (I9IO), p. 2271, §34Brown v. Brown, 72 N. J. Eq. 667, 65 Atl. 739 (19o7) ; Babbitt v. Fidelity
Trust Co., supra note 5.
' Coddington v. Stone, 36 N. J. Eq. 361 (1883) ; Parker v. Glover, 42 N. J.
Eq. 559, 9 Atl. 217 (1887). For a decision involving the question of what constitutes good faith and reasonable discretion, see: Beam v. Patterson Trust Co.,
81 N. J. Eq. 195, 86 AUt. 369 (93), aff'd, 83 N. J. Eq. 628, 9z At. 351 (1914).
'Fetrow v. Krause, 61 Ill. App. 238 (1895).
2Alston v. Alston, 34 Ala. I5 (1859) ; Preston v. Preston, oz Conn. 96,
128 At. 292 (1925) ; Roberts v. Roberts, Hard. 96 (1657) ; Duke of Beaufort v.
Berty, i P. Wins. 7o5 (1721).
'Where the defendant is not a natural parent but one in loco parentis, the
right of action is conceded. Treschnian v. Treschman, 28 Ind. App. 206, 61
N. E. 961 (i901) ; Dix v. Martin, 171 Mo. App. 266, 157 S. W. 133 (1913) ;
Clasen v. Pruhs, 69 Neb. 278, 95 N. W. 640 (I9O3) ; Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt.
114 (859).

NOTES

ing with this situation, twelve in the United States, and one in Canada.
As court after court in this country denied the right of action,4 the
law was apparently becoming crystallized to the effect that the parent
was immune from such a suit. However, a recent contrary decision
in New Hampshire,5 has not only re-opened the entire question but
has also demonstrated the fact that the law here is still in a state of
development. A brief consideration of several cases will be valuable
in disclosing the types of issues involved in such litigation.
Hewlett v. George,6 decided in i89I, is the first and the leading
case on the subject. The situation there was an action in tort for
false imprisonment brought by a minor child against her parent. The
court in holding that the action would not lie based its decision on a
consideration of reciprocal rights and duties and a policy of laissez
faire.7 In Roller v. Roller,8 a minor daughter, after prosecuting her
father criminally for rape, brought a civil action for damages. The
court was faced with probably the most extreme case possible. Nevertheless, it was felt that the interests of society would be better
served by blindly and unquestioningly following the dictates of public
policy enunciated in the Hewlett case than by drawing the distinctions this case called for. The next case 9 presented a situation
where the cause of action was the failure of the parent to exercise
reasonable care under circumstances which would have entitled a
stranger to a right of action. Again the child's right was denied, the court following the dogma of Hewlett v. George.
These three cases present examples of excessive punishment by
a parent, of the commission of an abhorrent and infamous felony,
and of negligence. It is important to note that the principles which
Mesite v. Kirchstein, iog Conn. 77, 145 AtI. 753 (1929) ; Smith v. Smith,
81 Ind. App. 566, 142 N. E. 128 (1924); Miller v. Pelzer, I59 Minn. 375, 199
N. W. 97 (1924), (1924) 9 MINN. L. REV. 76; Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703,
9 So. 885 (1891) ; Goldstein v. Goldstein, 4 N. J.Misc. 711, 134 Atl. 184 (1926) ;
Sorrentino v. Sorrentino, 248 N. Y. 626, 162 N. E. 55, (1928); Small v. Morrison, 185 N. C. 577, II8 S. E. 12, note 31 A. L.R. 1135 (1923), (1924) 33
YALTE L. J.315; Matarese v. Matarese, 47 R. I. 131, 131 AtI. 198 (925);
McKelvey v. McKelvey, iiI Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (19o), (1904) 17 HARv.
L. REv. 361; Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (19o5), (9o5) 53
U. oF PA. L. REv. 387; Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 26o, 212 N. W. 787 (1927);
Zutter v. O'Connell, 229 N. W. 74 (Wis. 193o).
Dunlap v. Dunlap, i5o At. 905 (N. H. 193o).
0
Supra note
7

4.
"But so long as the parent is under obligation to care for, guide and control, and the child is under reciprocal obligation to aid and comfort and obey,
no such action as this can be maintained. The peace of society, and of the families composing society, and a sound public policy, designed to subserve the repose of families and the best interests of society, forbid to the minor child a
right to appear in court in the assertion of a claim to civil redress for personal
injuries suffered at the hands of the parent. The state, through its criminal
laws, will give the minor child protection from parental violence and wrongdoing, and this is all the child can be heard to demand."
887. 8 Supra note 4.
Small v. Morrison, supra note 4.

Ibid. at 711, 9 So. at
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have governed in all these situations were first pronounced in a case
involving merely an abuse of the parent's privilege of disciplining the
child.' Had the Roller case been the first to arise, it is difficult to believe that the result would not have been different. The court in the
Hewlett case felt that the existing remedies of forfeiture of custody
and of criminal prosecution were a sufficient check to curb an unkind
or cruel parent. To allow a minor child to recover damages seemed
utterly foreign to the court's conception of the state of peace which
should prevail in the family; and to constitute an unwarranted interference attacking the very structure of the home. This opinion was
shared by Schouler 11 and is, undoubtedly, good policy in most situations. If the authority of the parent is to be questioned in domestic matters, no parent would feel safe in administering any sort of
discipline for fear that some court would deem it to be excessive.
When the Roller case arose, counsel urged the court to consider the
brutal act of the parent as an emancipation, and to distinguish the
case at bar from those of domestic discipline. The Washington court
was moved to a degree by the unusual facts, and the further argument of counsel that a rule promulgated to preserve family peace
should not be applied where the tranquility of the home had already
been destroyed by the act of the parent. It felt, however, that if a
distinction were drawn, the law would be thrown into utter confusion because of the difficulty of determining what degree of brutality
would be necessary to take a case out of the Hewlett rule. The
court justified its inhuman view in these words:
"There seems to be some reason in this argument, but it
overlooks the fact that courts, in determining their jurisdiction
or want of jurisdiction, rely upon certain uniform principles of
law, and, if it be once established that a minor child has a right
to sue a parent for a tort, there is no practical line of demarcation that can be drawn; for the same principle that would allow
the action in the case of a heinous crime, like the one involved
in this case, would allow an action to be brought.for any other
tort." 12
0

Hewlett v. George, supra note 4.
"The question, moreover, is sometimes raised in these days, whether a

young son or daughter occupying the filial relation may not, on becoming of age,

sue the parent or qasi-parent for alleged maltreatment or other injury. With
reference to a blood parent, however, all such litigation seems abhorrent to the
idea of family discipline which all nations, rude or civilized, have so steadily
inculcated, and thel privacy or mutual confidence which should obtain in the
household. An unkind and cruel parent may and should be punished at the time
of the offence, if any offender at all, forfeiting custody and suffering criminal
penalties if need be; but for the minor child who continues, it may be for years,
at home and unemancipated, to bring a suit when arrived at majority, free from
parental control and other counter-influences, against his own parent appears
quite contrary to good policy." ScHoutLR, Do. .-Esric RELAT IoNS (6th ed. 192i)
12

Supra note 4 at 244, 79 Pac. at 789.

NOTES

Since the family has always been considered as a unit of government, and since the development of both the health and the morals of
the children has always been the responsibility of the parent, it seems
but reasonable that the parent be given wide latitude in the rearing
of the child. No child should be permitted to question the authority
of the parent in domestic matters. The remedies mentioned in the
Hewlett case are sufficient to insure the safety of the child. Where
no question of domestic control is involved, however, the situation is
quite different. Professor McCurdy 13 has suggested that in these cases
the parent be given an unqualified privilege. It does not shock one's
sense of justice to say that a parent correcting a child for some prank
or disobedience should not be called upon to respond in money damages even though the punishment be excessive. But the failure to
recognize a difference where a child playing about the family garage
is run down by the carelessness of the father in the operation of his
automobile or where a child is employed in the father's business and
with other workmen is injured because some defective scaffolding
or materials are supplied seems indicative of a lack of discernment.
In such a case the child should have the same right of action as any
stranger. No question of parental authority is involved. Should
considerations of family tranquility, often inapplicable, operate to
defeat the right of the child when strangers injured in the same disaster may recover? 14
The question of insurance renders the problem more difficult.
The basis for the denial of the right of action is the argument of
public policy that a contrary rule would disturb the tranquility of the
home and the family. Where the parent is indemnified by insurance,
in reality, an adverse judgment would be a financial benefit rather
than a detriment. The reason for the rule of the Hewlett case does
not apply. If it is discarded in insurance cases, however, then the
result would be in conflict with the settled principle that the liability
of an insurer is purely derivative. It would be illogical to impose
liability on one insured and to exempt the uninsured from suit altogether. This is, however, exactly what the court did in the recent
case of Dunlap v. Dunlap."; The court, realizing the radical step it
was taking, attempted to rationalize its decision by considering the
question of insurance as one of the facts of the case. When it is
remembered that the fact of insurance is never even a part of the
record of a cause, this confuses rather than clarifies the argument.
The reasoning of the court appears in the following quotation from
the opinion:
"It is said that, since the insurer is liable only when the
father is, it cannot be concluded that the father is liable because
McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relations (i93o) 43 HARV.
L. REv. io3o.
"See Straub, May a Child Sue a Parent for a Personal Tort (1924) 28
LAW NorEs 1o8.
I Supranote 5.
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the insurer is. In a narrow sense this is true. But the essential
fact which establishes the suability of the father is that he has
provided for satisfying the judgment in some way which removes the suit from the class promotive of family discord." 16
It is probable that the reasoning of the New Hampshire court
will not long endure in our law. Nevertheless, the ultimate result is to
be commended, and the courage of the court in departing from a
long line of contrary decisions is to be admired. Though the rule
of the majority is just when applied in situations such as Hewlett v.
George where it originated, it is surely productive of great injustice
when applied in cases such as Roller v. Roller and Small v.Morrison. This was the attitude of a foreign court when the problem
arose for the first time in Canada." That court dismissed the array
of American authority with the comment that a right of action existed for every wrong, and that the relation of the parties was immaterial. The opinion of the Canadian court has always been the
thought of the text authorities 1 in England where there are no
judicial rulings on the subject.
Involved as the problem is, considerable study and analysis will
be necessary before a satisfactory solution can be achieved. In a
recent article, 19 Professor McCurdy has done much to clarify thequestion. The decision of the New Hampshire court well illustrates
the extent to which courts are influenced by the opinions of academic
authorities, for the Dunlap case was decided shortly after the appearance of Professor McCurdy's article iththe Harvard Law Review
and the treatise was relied upon by the court in disposing of many
of the arguments formerly advanced by courts in refusing the right
of action. It is to be hoped that in the further development of the
law on this subject, the combined efforts of the courts and the text
authorities will result in a continuation of the courageous progress
begun by the New Hampshire court.
N. L.
"Ibid. at 913.
" Fidelity and Casualty Co. v. Marchand, 1924] 4 D. L. M. 157.
"ADDIsON, ToRrs (186o) 423; PoLwxoc,
ToRTs (1887) IO; CEXRK AND
LINDSELi, ToRTs (1889) 152; EvERsLEY, DomEsTic RE.,
ioxs (1885) 6oi.
"Supra note 13.

